The Real Benghazi Tragedy

To contact us Click HERE


        Commentary by Lt. Colonel John Lewis Cook, USA(ret.)
For weeks now, theBenghazi tragedy has been a major story in Washington.    It’s safe to say that now, most Americansare aware of what happened to our consulate there back in September.  Some points are no longer in dispute.  Four Americans died over a number of hourswhen the consulate was attacked multiple  times. No rescue effort was launched in a timely matter that could havepossibly saved them.  If this were acriminal trial, both the prosecution and defense would stipulate to these factsand move forward.  
However, this isWashington, where the favorite game is the blood sport of raw politics, whereeach side fires on the other with whatever ammunition is available, hoping toinflict serious casualties.  TheRepublicans accuse the administration of deliberately mischaracterizing theattack as spontaneous out of fear this would destroy President Obama’scarefully built narrative that it wasn’t terrorism.  As a result, the counterterrorism brain trustwas not convened.  Neither was a rescueattempted.  The Democrats fired backquickly, accusing the Republicans of playing politics with national securityand engaging in vicious, personal attacks against senior administrationofficials.  And so it goes, with eachside firing volley after volley, not so much searching for the truth as thedesire to cause damage.  Yet, somewherebetween these polarized positions lies the real explanation of this tragedysince neither side has prevailed in this slugfest. 
Current body countstands at four, all from the Department of State.  Susan Rice is no longer a candidate forSecretary of State and three bureaucrats from Foggy Bottom were thrown underthe bus.  All this was on the diplomaticside since the State Department was responsible for the consulate security andclearly, security was not up to standards. That will, no doubt, be addressedand corrected.   However, once the attack began, the situationquickly turned into a military issue if a rescue attempt was in the cards, and,at this point, the State Department was no longer a player.  Diplomats are of little value in a fire fight under any circumstances.  In any event, these two issues must beseparated and dealt with individually. 
The most troubling partof the Benghazi story was not that the consulate  was under protected. Rather,  it was the rescue attempt that neverhappened.  Why not? Aside from all thehype,  this has to be carefully examinedin an objective manner, free of recrimination and personal attacks. This iswhere the postmortem should focus now, not the lack of security.   So whywas no rescue mounted immediately?  Ithink Secretary of Defense Panetta gave an unwittingly  strong indicator back in late October when he toldreporters, “The basic principle is that you don’t deploy forces into harm’s waywithout knowing what’s going on, without having some real-time informationabout what’s taking place.”  He went on to explain that, under theseconditions, forces simply could not be put at risk in this confused situation.  Onit’s face, this explanation seemed quite reasonable and the reporters dutifullyreported it.  And why not?  After all, this doctrine is practiced dailyin official Washington.  No seniorbureaucrat would dream of walking into a meeting or conference without knowing what’son the agenda.  More importantly, isthere a hidden agenda that could blow up in his face?  These people are very risk-adverse and theydid not work their into the highest levels of government by being easilyambushed or blindsided.   This explainswhy important meetings are often cancelled on short notice and why someofficials suddenly become ill.  We areall a product of our experience and, unfortunately, Mr. Panetta is no exception.  
Let’s give Mr. Panettathe benefit of the doubt and agree that he honestly believes this.  If he does believe it, then it exposes aserious misunderstanding of the military’s most basic reason to exist.  If we carried this  view to its logical conclusion, we wouldnever deploy military forces anywhere because real-time information and groundtruth are rarely available to the men leading the charge and what is availableis usually wrong.  The men on the groundunderstand this reality and they accept it.  That’s why they are very good at adapting torapid changes in a hostile environment. They practice various scenarios and contingencies all the time becausethey know, whatever they are told, the situation they encounter will usually bedifferent.  Of course, they have nopolitical ambitions so they can focus on what they do best.  This is a cautionary tale that officialWashington should take to heart.  Thisbrutal fact is what separates line units in combat from bureaucrats inWashington. They are from two different cultures and this is what dividesthem.  Neither culture fully understandsthe other.
If this is truly whathappened, then Mr. Panetta does deserve credit for thinking he was doing theright thing, but he is wrong this time.  Itappears that he is taking responsibility for not responding to the franticpleas for help once the attack started and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff has provided him some cover. However, both of these men were in Washington and they are the seniorleaders of the Department of Defense, not the Department of State. We haveevery right to expect sterner stuff from these guys.  Had local ground commanders been given themission, a rescue effort would have been launched immediately.  That’s how the system works.  It’s called the chain of command and, whenused, it works with incredible efficiency. However, in this case, it was obviously not even initiated because theSecretary of Defense was not convinced it would succeed. The truth is, nomilitary operation has the luxury of guaranteed success, no matter howcarefully planned or how critical.  Therewas no guarantee on May 6^th, 1944 that we would be successful, yetno one called it off for fear of failure.   However, without making the effort, we canguarantee failure.  This is whatleadership is about, what it has always been about. 
If we learn anythingfrom Benghazi, it is this.  Even theSecretary of Defense must leave operational decisions to those commandersclosest to the operation, not thousands of miles away and trust them, notsecond guess them.  Tell them what needsto be done, give them what they need. and leave them alone.  They can perform quite well without interferencefrom Washington. In the meantime, Washington will, no doubt, continue toconduct its own kind of political warfare. That will not change.  However,the military should be left out of these purely partisan food fights and notget chewed up in the process.  
About the AuthorLieutenant Colonel JohnLewis Cook, United States Army (Retired), “served as the Senior Advisor to theMinistry of Interior in Kabul, Afghanistan, with responsibility for developingthe force structure for the entire Afghan National Police.  As of 2012, this force totals 157,000.  From March 2008 until August 2012, his accessand intimate associations with all levels of the Afghan government andcoalition forces have provided him with an unprecedented insight into thepolicies which will determine the outcome of the war.  It is this insight, coupled with his contactsand associations throughout Afghanistan that form the basis of Afghanistan: ThePerfect Failure.
Click to read moreabout Lt. Colonel John Lewis Cook